

The Determinants of Indulgence in Corruption Among Law Enforcement Personnel in Malaysia

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ABSTRACT

This study investigated the determinants of indulgence in corruption among law enforcement agency personnel in Malaysia. This study focussed on three law enforcement agencies in Malaysia, the Royal Malaysia Police Department, the Road and Transport Department, and the Immigration Department. The Fraud Diamond Theory was used to form the framework and develop the hypotheses. It concerns corruption among law enforcement personnel using the four elements: capability, pressure, rationalization, and opportunity. There were four hypotheses developed in this study. The researcher used face-to-face and online surveys (questionnaires) as data collection method and the participation of respondents was voluntary. 150 questionnaires were issued for the collection of data through an online survey and face-to-face interviews. The data collection process took two months, from May 2020 to June 2020. A total of 142 questionnaires were received, however only 109 questionnaires were usable. Based on the findings, there is a significant positive correlation between self-influence and family influence-related and the indulgence in corruption among law enforcement personnel. This research indicated that family pressure and self-influence attributes were accepted. However, another two attributes namely public perception and peer pressure, were rejected. This study has important implications for national or international policymakers to acknowledge that anti-corruption policies play a crucial role to curb corruption among law enforcement agencies and understand the need to adopt these anti-corruption policies according to each nation's economic and cultural context.

Keywords: corruption, indulgence in corruption, law enforcement, fraud diamond theory

ARTICLE INFO

Article History:

Received: 6 October 2021

Accepted: 13 January 2022

Published: 30 April 2022

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INTRODUCTION

Corruption is a widespread global problem that has negative impacts on economic and societal development. It is also subject to a vast range of institutional, jurisdictional, societal, and economic conditions (Dimant & Tosato, 2018). Transparency International Malaysia, Former President Datuk Seri Akhbar Satar said according to a report released by Transparency International, the country remained at 47 out of 100 in the CPI polls in the year 2016 and 2017 (Satar, 2017). The CPI score is based on the level of corruption perceptions in the country's public sector on a scale of zero (i.e., the most corrupt) to 100 (i.e. the cleanest). Effective law enforcement personnel are essential to ensure the credibility of anti-corruption efforts and break the cycle of impunity and prevent large-scale corruption. High profile corruption cases must be investigated and then prosecuted to ensure the integrity of law enforcement agencies. This is to restore public confidence in levels of internal security and the rule of law.

Law enforcement personnel involved in corruption destroy the reputation of the law enforcement agencies, the criminal justice system, the government, and society. For many years, corruption in law enforcement agencies has been a national issue. A study by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) showed that 63.3 per cent of complaints received were related to the public sector, making it the most vulnerable to corruption in the country. From 2013 to 2018, a study showed that 42.8 per cent of complaints received related to the procurement sector, 23.9 per cent to enforcement sectors and 8.6 per cent to licensing and permits which concludes that these are the three main sectors contributing 75.3 per cent of the total complaints received by the MACC (MACC, 2019).

The habit of corruption involving public servants, especially among law enforcement agency personnel, often attracts standard coverage from social media because their concerns implicate public interest in general. The law enforcement agencies that are commonly associated with corruption are the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP), the Immigration Department of Malaysia (IDM), and the Road Transport Department (RTD) (Azrae, 2018). This research analysed the complicity of the central government in the law enforcement agencies, in corruption activities as reported on social media involving arrest, detention, prosecution and conviction of corruption cases among members of RMP, IDM and RTD. Therefore, there is a need to

highlight the causes of corruption among law enforcement personnel in Malaysia. This is because the statistics of arrests in law enforcement agencies showed an increase from the year 2017 to 2018. Besides, the RMP, IDM and RTD are the three law enforcement agencies with high-rank arrests related to corruption (MACC, 2019). Hence, this study was conducted to identify the relationship between family influence, public perception, peer pressure, and self-influence and the indulgence in corruption among law enforcement personnel.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

According to the Fraud Diamond Theory (FDT), an individual who is under pressure (Family Influence) from the family wishes and fulfilling the family desires causes the personnel to be involved in corruption. Efendi (2007) and Dorminey (2012) stated that the relationship between family pressure would be one cause why corruption occurs, such as financial problems and the fulfilment of family desires. The second element is opportunity (Self Influence). A person commits corruption because there is an opportunity to do so for their benefit. Therefore, law enforcement agency personnel have the power and authority to use and make it an opportunity to commit corruption. Hunton (2004) explains that opportunity exists when the internal control is inadequate or when collusion exists, allowing the perpetrators to avoid any control or when collusion exists, allowing the perpetrators to avoid any control (Norman et al., 2010; Schuchter & Levi, 2015). Rationalisation (Peers' Pressure) is one of the independent variables for indulgence in corruption among law enforcement agency personnel. All work duties have been accomplished by coordination in the operation of law enforcement departments. The other teammate will still do the same thing when one of the team member commits corruption (rationalisation) (Dorminey et al., 2012; Murphy & Dacin, 2011). The fourth element is capability (Public Perception) to trigger fraud only when people have the right potential and are in the right place. These traits include a person's position or function within the organisation that may furnish the ability to exploit an opportunity for fraud that is not available to others. The power of law enforcement in committing corruption with the capability of a person who has the authority in performing their duties. The capability to perform their duties considers the public perception of law enforcement personnel to indulge in corruption

(Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004). Therefore, this study attempted to identify the relationship between family influence, public perception, peer pressure, and self-influence in indulgence in corruption among law enforcement agencies personnel through the lens of the FDT.

According to Sathappan et al. (2016), family refers to a spouse or children; respondents identified family as children who are weak in a critical situation, lack finance, love of their family, pressure from the wife, family needs or situation. Involvement in corruption is due to pressure from the wife and family who demand a luxury lifestyle beyond the capability of an individual. Whenever their spouse or children demand, they may be inclined to accept bribes (OECD, 2007). According to Mohamed et al. (2021), even honest employees are capable of fraud in an atmosphere that places overwhelming pressure on them. The impact of corruption can be quite different, depending on the characteristics and the strength of family ties (Litina, 2018). Ljunge (2015) reports that a stronger bonded family promotes civic virtues among them and the disapproval of corruption. The fact that corruption occurs as a form of behaviour violating the official ethics of public services, stems from social norms that emphasise gift-giving and loyalty to family or clan, rather than the rule of law (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2011).

Some forms of corruption indulgence relate to an informal form of social security, where the family or the immediate community takes care of its members (Sumah, 2018). According to the fair-salary hypothesis, if public officials could earn enough to make ends meet, they would have fewer reasons to ask for bribes (Becker & Stigler 1974; Van Rijckeghem & Weder 2001). To make up for such a loss, public officials who received salary raises may seek to extract even more bribes (Fjeldstad, 2005). Corruption is a personal benefit, other than one's salary when received. The benefit might not always be in cash. It could be in the form of favours, holidays, sexual services, inappropriate hospitality or preferment for oneself or one's family (Graycar, 2015). Dwivedi et al. (2012) describe that corruption is rooted in many societies where nepotism is variously accepted and organised through parenting, family relationship, ethnicity, religion, neighbourhood, and cast. Based on the above arguments, the hypothesis below was developed.

H1: There is a significant relationship between family influence and indulgence in corruption among law enforcement agency personnel.

Bribes by a firm to government officials can confer a strategic or tactical advantage to the firm over its rivals by helping it speedily obtain licenses or have its violations of some regulations overlooked by government officials (Iriyama et al., 2016). The capability showed transactional perspective holds that corruption is an agreement between two parties: a power-wielding official and an individual or business that needs access to the authority or service that the official controls (Coffman & Anderson, 2018). In environments characterised by high levels of corruption, political connections and longstanding relationships with government officials can benefit companies from expediency in the issuance of legal permits and authorisations as government officials prioritise those firms willing to pay a bribe (Chen et al., 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Fisman, 2001; Lui, 1985). On the other hand, the capability to commit fraud could be exploited by the authoritative power held by an individual (Husin, 2020).

According to Cabelkova (2001), the reason for corrupt practices influences both the demand and the supply of corrupt actions. Corruption beliefs may, therefore, promote or reduce the degree of current corruption. The definition of corruption differs widely across cultures and individuals. Consequently, social rules may differ significantly from one culture to another and between people; the behaviour may be a common activity in a society; in another, it may be considered corrupt, and the willingness to bribe is affected by moral beliefs and values as stated by Melgar et al. (2010). Therefore, the perception of corruption is a social phenomenon. Thus, the following hypothesis was developed:

H2: There is a significant relationship between public perception and the indulgence in corruption among law enforcement agency personnel.

The organisational dimension is an essential factor in the analysis of gift-bribe practices, which can be categorised into petty corruption and aggravated corruption. Petty corruption means that officials bend the rules in minor ways for the benefit of friends. Aggravated corruption is when clients need patron intervention to get an administrative due process, gifts or rewards being expected in return by officials. As a kickback for extending due processes, officials will receive in return for payoffs (Andersson, 2002). As a result, peers who do not take a bribe may face a situation of not being promoted, being transferred to another division, or being isolated by peers at work (Sathappan et al., 2016). Frequently, those who commit fraud

believe they are working honestly but are undervalued in their jobs and are not recognised by their superiors through promotions or exemplary service awards (Husin, 2020). Relationships of trust and loyalty between public officials can distort judgment and lead to unethical behaviour (Russell, 2018). Peer pressure is not only to obtain financial benefits, but also to have connections or interests with suppliers, friends, or family (Caulfield & Steckler, 2014). When corruption becomes a norm, it becomes a normality in an organisation and keeps on going as though it is a lifestyle (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). Thus, the peer consequences of selfishness, fairness, and corruption may be different. Cabelkova (2001) argues that if a person lives in a highly corrupt society, he appears to believe that taking or giving bribes is the usual daily conduct of making deals. In a culture like this, being unethical is not viewed in the same way as being dishonest or selfish. Hence, this study developed the following hypothesis:

H3: There is a significant relationship between peer pressure and indulgence in corruption among law enforcement agency personnel.

Occurring literature reveals that materialism is positively correlated with corrupt acts (Tang & Liu, 2011). Using money carelessly causes individuals to be less helpful and dishonest when dealing with those who have to work hard for the money (Gino & Mogilner, 2014) and even be involved in corruption scandals (Kouchaki et al., 2013). Empirical evidence suggests that individuals with a high degree of materialism are more self-oriented, focused more on money, success, influence, and status, and less bothered by others (Bauer et al., 2012). According to Kasser et al. (2014), it has been shown that self-esteem is related in a negative manner to materialism. Self-esteem helps individuals respond to self-esteem pressures by emphasizing their ability to control and be more independent (Vohs & Heatherton, 2001). Individuals with low self-esteem, by comparison, usually use money to 'cover up' for their poor self-esteem (Jiang et al., 2015) and to require reputation and many possessions to identify themselves (Mogilner & Aaker, 2009). In addition, fundamental awareness of fraud is important in distinguishing a person from being an ethical or dishonest person, which could deter the possibility of corruption (Zahari et al., 2021).

Sathappan et al. (2016) explored the causes of bribery among law enforcement officers in Selangor. The findings were derived from four themes based on the cause of bribery, namely family, public, individual

and organisation. This study found that persistent family problem due to failure in financial budgeting needs leads to bribery. Greed, ambition, and immorality have been known to human society ever since the emergence of civilisation. People use every tool available to them: kinship, common past, school contacts, common interests, friendship and, political as well as religious ties (Sumah, 2018). Manipulation in financial reporting is also rampant as the result of corporate unethical practices (Busirin, Azmi, & Zakaria, 2015). Corrupt behaviour arises not from a conflict between being good and being selfish but instead because of a tension between conflicting moral norms as reported by Dungan et al. (2014). Mishler and Rose (2008) found that the perspectives of individuals continued to affect their views of corruption. Hence, the authors claimed that individuals' perceptions of corruption are greatly affected by their history of bribery, where individuals who have had to pay bribes appear to have higher perceptions of corruption than those in society. Based on the above arguments, the hypothesis below was formulated:

H4: There is a significant relationship between self-influence and the indulgence in corruption among law enforcement agency personnel.

RESEARCH METHOD

Data Collection

The study used a questionnaires survey for data collection. The researcher used face-to-face interviews and online surveys (questionnaires) as data collection method for this research, and the participation of respondents was voluntary. There were a total of 150 questionnaires issued for the collection of data through an online survey and face-to-face interviews. The data collection process took two months, from May 2020 to June 2020. In the earlier part of the data collection, 63 questionnaires were obtained, while 79 questionnaires were received towards the end of the period. Out of 142 questionnaires received, only 109 were usable. The survey contained 45 questions in total, which would require the respondent to rate based on a five-point Likert scale from 0 to 5: "1" indicates strongly disagree while "5" indicates strongly disagree. The target respondents of this study were law enforcement personnel in three law enforcement agencies which are RMPD, RTD and IDM in Putrajaya.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Demographic Analysis

The law enforcement agencies involved, as shown in Table 1, were 45.9 per cent from the RMP, 28.4 per cent from the RTD and 25.7 per cent from the IDM. The gender category of the respondents was 72.5 per cent male and 27.5 per cent female. Academic qualification categories were 37.6 per cent SPM, 8.3 per cent STPM, 29.4 per cent Diploma, 22.9 per cent bachelor’s degree and 1.8 per cent Master/PhD Degree. The respondents working experience categories were 15.5 per cent had less than 3 years, 21.1 per cent had between 3 – 6 years of experience, 12.8 per cent with 7 – 10 years, 34.9 per cent with 11 – 14 years and 14.7 per cent had more than 15 years of working experience.

Table 1: Analysis Summary Profile Demographic of Respondent

| Item | Frequencies (N=109) | Percentage (%) | Cumulative Percentage (%) |
|------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| Law Enforcement Agencies | | | |
| Royal Police Malaysia | 50 | 45.9 | 45.9 |
| Road Transport Department | 31 | 28.4 | 74.3 |
| Immigration Department of Malaysia | 28 | 25.7 | 100.0 |
| Gender | | | |
| Male | 79 | 72.5 | 72.5 |
| Female | 30 | 27.5 | 100.0 |
| Academic Qualification | | | |
| SPM | 41 | 37.6 | 3.76 |
| STPM | 9 | 8.3 | 45.9 |
| Diploma | 32 | 29.4 | 75.2 |
| Bachelor | 25 | 22.9 | 98.2 |
| Master/PhD | 2 | 1.8 | 100.0 |
| Working Experience | | | |
| Less than 3 years | 18 | 16.5 | 16.5 |
| 3 – 6 years | 23 | 21.1 | 37.6 |
| 7 – 10 years | 14 | 12.8 | 50.5 |
| 11 – 14 years | 38 | 34.9 | 85.3 |
| 15 years and above | 16 | 14.7 | 100.0 |

Descriptive Statistics

As shown in Table 2 below, the mean score for the items was between 2.960 to 4.760. The highest mean score was for B3 “I believe that I am not willing to make false claims related to my official duty” = 4.760. It showed that most of the personnel were not willing to make false claims related to their official duty. However, the lowest mean score was for B5 “I have not seen or heard of my colleague who is involved with corruption” = 2.960, which indicated that the personnel have seen or heard that their colleagues were involved in corruption.

Table 2: Mean Score for Dependent Variable – Indulgence in corruption

| No | Items | Mean | Standard Deviation |
|----|---|-------|--------------------|
| B1 | I believe that I am not willing to be offered corruption by an individual either to commit or not commit any wrongdoings related to my official duty. | 4.590 | 0.755 |
| B2 | I believe that I am not willing to accept corruption from any individual either to commit or not commit any wrongdoings related to my official duty. | 4.750 | 0.573 |
| B3 | I believe that I am not willing to make false claims related to my official duty. | 4.760 | 0.518 |
| B4 | I believe that I am not willing to abuse my designation or position to commit corruption. | 4.750 | 0.589 |
| B5 | I have not seen or heard of my colleague who is involved with corruption. | 2.960 | 1.355 |
| B6 | I believe that I am not willing to accept gifts in the form of money, goods and services from any individual who has an official interest in my agency. | 4.610 | 0.684 |
| B7 | I believe that am not willing to accept gifts in the form of money, goods, or services in consideration of the services provided. | 4.630 | 0.668 |

As shown in Table 3 below the mean score for the items was between 3.630 to 4.750. The respondents responded well to question number C9 “I believe that I am not willing to commit corruption for the future of my children”, with the highest mean score of 4.750 with standard deviation of 0.535. Most of the respondents acknowledged that they are unwilling to commit corruption for the future of their children.

As shown in C4, "My salary as enforcement personnel is sufficient to accommodate my family's desires", the respondents in general did not really agree that their salary is sufficient to accommodate their family needs.

Table 3: Mean Score for Independent Variable – Family Influence

| No | Items | Mean | Standard Deviation |
|-----|---|-------|--------------------|
| C1 | I believe that I am not willing to abuse my designation or position for the interest of my family members. | 4.530 | 0.831 |
| C2 | I believe that I am not willing to give confidential information on the groundwork operations to my family to avoid them being detained/arrested. | 4.480 | 0.831 |
| C3 | I believe that I am not willing to commit corruption because of pressure from the luxury lifestyle of my family members. | 4.660 | 0.662 |
| C4 | My salary as enforcement personnel is sufficient to accommodate my family's desires. | 3.630 | 1.152 |
| C5 | I believe that I am not willing to commit corruption to accommodate my household expenses. | 4.650 | 0.642 |
| C6 | I feel that the burden of household debt does not urge me to receive corruption to satisfy my family's desires. | 4.550 | 0.759 |
| C7 | I believe that I am not willing to make a false claim to accommodate my family's expenses and desires. | 4.600 | 0.727 |
| C8 | I believe that I am not willing to commit corruption because of stress from my spouse's luxury lifestyle. | 4.680 | 0.625 |
| C9 | I believe that I am not willing to commit corruption for the future of my children. | 4.750 | 0.535 |
| C10 | I believe that I am not willing to commit corruption to ensure the enjoyment of my family. | 4.700 | 0.641 |

As shown in Table 4 the highest mean score was for D10 "Cases of corruption by enforcement personnel have not resulted in causing the public to lose their trust in the enforcement agency" = 4.160. Most of the respondents admitted that cases of corruption by enforcement personnel have not resulted in causing the public to lose their trust in the enforcement agency. However, the lowest score of 2.890 was for D6 "The current modernization has not seen corruption as a mechanism to facilitate official dealing in my department", indicated that corruption was seen as a tool to facilitate the business dealing in their department.

Table 4: Mean Score for Independent Variable – Public Perception

| No | Items | Mean | Standard Deviation |
|-----|---|-------|--------------------|
| D1 | The public is not willing to offer corruption to avoid fines and legal action. | 4.010 | 0.821 |
| D2 | The public who has not dealt with the enforcement personnel is willing to give gifts in the form of money, goods, or services. | 3.750 | 0.956 |
| D3 | The public is not willing to commit corruption to make things easier for them. | 3.950 | 0.886 |
| D4 | It is not a norm for the public to give a gift to my agency in return for the service rendered. | 2.890 | 1.161 |
| D5 | Intense competition in the modern era has not influenced the granting of corruption as a mechanism to accelerate official dealing. | 3.700 | 1.077 |
| D6 | The current modernization has not seen corruption as a mechanism to facilitate official dealing in my department. | 2.980 | 1.158 |
| D7 | The public views the enforcement personnel as not easily being offered corruption while on duty. | 3.630 | 1.165 |
| D8 | The public and law enforcement personnel do not receive benefits through corrupt practices. | 3.350 | 1.209 |
| D9 | The enforcement personnel's integrity on corruption issues is not seen as poor by the public. | 3.960 | 1.051 |
| D10 | Cases of corruption by enforcement personnel have not resulted in causing the public to lose their trust in the enforcement agency. | 4.160 | 0.994 |

Additionally, as shown in Table 5 the mean score for the items was between 2.990 to 4.550. The highest mean score was for E9 “I believe that I am not willing to make a false claim together with my colleagues while on duty” = 4.550, indicated that majority of the respondents agreed that they are not willing to make false claim with their colleagues while on duty. However, concerning E1 “I know my colleagues have not been involved in corruption”, scored the lowest mean score of 2.990 suggesting that the respondents agreed that their colleagues have been involved in corruption.

Table 5: Mean Score for Independent Variable – Peer Pressure

| No | Items | Mean | Standard Deviation |
|----|--|-------|--------------------|
| E1 | I know my colleagues have not been involved in corruption. | 2.990 | 1.145 |
| E2 | I have not been invited to join my colleague in committing corruption. | 4.040 | 1.017 |
| E3 | The enforcement personnel in my department take note of any corruption act practised by other personnel. | 4.000 | 1.004 |
| E4 | My colleagues commit corruption with fear. | 3.630 | 1.095 |
| E5 | I will not be shunned away by my colleague if I do not commit corruption. | 4.140 | 1.035 |
| E6 | Corruption has not become one of the cultures in my department. | 3.920 | 1.011 |
| E7 | My colleagues in the operation department are not exposed more to committing corruption. | 3.130 | 1.256 |
| E8 | I believe that I am not willing to hide corrupt practices committed together with my colleagues. | 4.200 | 0.893 |
| E9 | I believe that I am not willing to make a false claim together with my colleagues while on duty. | 4.550 | 0.680 |

As shown in Table 6 below, the mean score for the items was between 4.530 to 4.680. The highest mean score was 4.680 for F1 “I believe that I am not willing to commit corruption because of my luxury living habits”. It indicates that the majority of the respondents were not willing to commit corruption because of their luxurious lifestyle. In contrast, the lowest mean score of 4.530 was for F7 “I believe that I am willing to abuse my job position for my interest” = 1.211, F6 “Insufficient salary among the enforcement personnel does not lead me to execute corruption”. Even though majority of the respondents agreed that their salary was insufficient, however, it did not lead them to commit corruption.

Table 6: Mean Score for Independent Variable – Self-Influence

| No | Items | Mean | Standard Deviation |
|----|--|-------|--------------------|
| F1 | I believe that I am not willing to commit corruption because of my luxury living habits. | 4.680 | 0.667 |
| F2 | I believe that I am not willing to commit corruption because of my debt. | 4.650 | 0.696 |
| F3 | A luxury lifestyle is not a necessity even if it is exceeding income generation. | 4.550 | 0.804 |
| F4 | I believe that I am not willing to abuse my job position for my interest. | 4.660 | 0.629 |
| F5 | I believe that I am not willing to commit corruption of the weaknesses of the procedure if I have the chance. | 4.630 | 0.690 |
| F6 | I believe that I am not willing to commit corruption from the lack of monitoring of the integrity unit in my department. | 4.600 | 0.725 |
| F7 | Insufficient salary among the enforcement personnel does not lead me to execute corruption. | 4.530 | 0.778 |
| F8 | I believe that I am not willing to commit corruption because of being jealous of my friend's luxurious lifestyle. | 4.650 | 0.644 |

Pearson's Correlation Analysis

Table 7 shows the correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variables of this study. The result of 0.631 and 0.604 shows a moderate positive correlation between family influence, self-influence, and indulgence in corruption. Peer pressure and indulgence in corruption showed a low positive correlation at 0.297. However, the correlation result of 0.105 showed no correlation between public perception and indulgence in corruption.

Table 7: Pearson Correlations Between Independent and Dependent Variables

| | IC | FI | PP | PPR | SI |
|-------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----|
| Indulgence in corruption (IC) | 1 | | | | |
| Family Influence (FI) | 0.631** | 1 | | | |
| Public Perception (PP) | 0.105 | 0.053 | 1 | | |
| Peers' Pressure (PPR) | 0.297** | 0.272** | 0.375** | 1 | |
| Self-Influence (SI) | 0.604** | 0.713** | -0.021 | 0.248** | 1 |

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Multiple Regression Analysis

Table 8 shows the results of the multiple regression analysis. The first hypothesis of this study was to determine the relationship between family influence and the indulgence in corruption among law enforcement agency personnel. The results from the analysis showed that family influence had a significant relationship with indulgence in corruption, with a mean value of $p=0.000$, $p<0.05$. Therefore, H1 was accepted. Past research has explored the causes of corruption from four themes based on the cause of bribery, namely family, public, individual and organisation (Sathappan et al., 2016). This finding generally confirmed and supported the existence of a positive and significant effect of indulgence in corruption and family influence on law enforcement personnel.

Table 8: Multiple Regression Analysis between Family Influence, Public Perception, Peers Pressure, Self-Influence on Indulgence in Corruption

| Variables | Standardised Coefficients Beta | T | Sig |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|-------|--------|
| Family Influence | 0.382 | 3.680 | 0.000* |
| Public Perception | 0.056 | 0.711 | 0.478 |
| Peers Pressure | 0.095 | 1.170 | 0.245 |
| Self-Influence | 0.309 | 2.983 | 0.004* |

Independent Variables: Indulgence in corruption

*Sig level, $p<0.05$

Additionally, a hypothesis was developed to test the direct effect of self-influence and indulgence in corruption. The results from the analysis showed that self-influence had a significant positive relationship with indulgence in corruption, with a mean value of $p=0.004$, $p<0.05$. Therefore, H4 was accepted. Individuals who commit fraud possess a particular mindset that allows them to justify their fraudulent behaviours. The opportunity

that exists in organisations has a significant impact on an individual's decision to commit fraud (Ruankaew, 2016). In contrast, the second and third hypotheses to test the relationship between public perception and peer pressure among law enforcement agency personnel showed an insignificant relationship with indulgence in corruption, with a mean value of $p=0.478$ and $p=0.245$, $p>0.05$, respectively. Therefore, H2 and H3 were rejected. Thus, public perception and peer pressure are not variables that influence indulgence in corruption of the law enforcement agency personnel.

CONCLUSION

This study focussed on identifying the indulgence in corruption among law enforcement agency personnel focusing on family influence, public perception, peer pressure, and self-influence among law enforcement personnel in three agencies. The involvement of civil servants, especially government enforcement agencies in corruption is an alarming phenomenon. As reported by local news reports, cases of arrest, detention, prosecution, and conviction for corruption offences involving agencies, and government enforcement occur almost every month throughout the year. It is important to instill ethical values among law enforcement agency personnel to help the government to curb and combat corruption in Malaysia. The findings from this study provide information and give further understanding to the government agencies, and policymakers. This study also attempted to add to the existing literature and render support for the past theories related to the relationship between family influence, public perception, peer pressure and self-influence, and indulgence in corruption among law enforcement personnel in Malaysia. It wished the practice of proper law enforcement personnel qualities can create a climate that will, in turn, reduce the indulgence in corruption among law enforcement agency personnel.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We are gratefully acknowledging the financial support provided by Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), Malaysia (Grant 600-TNCPI 5/3/DDF (AKAUN) (002/2020).

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